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NOTES
ESCAPING A RIGID ANALYSIS: THE SHIFT TO A FACT-BASED
APPROACH FOR CRIME OF VIOLENCE INQUIRIES
INVOLVING ESCAPE OFFENSES
INTRODUCTION
The introduction of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines to the federal
criminal justice system in 1987 arose in large part due to the call for
more uniformity in sentencing.' The Guidelines have sought to meet
the overarching goal of limiting disparity in sentencing and to
impose harsher sentences on repeat offenders.2 The pursuit of these
two objectives has greatly influenced the manner in which federal
courts assess criminal convictions. For instance, several federal
appellate courts, in determining whether past or present convictions
constitute crimes of violence under the career offender provision of
the Guidelines, have employed a categorical analysis.3 Rather than
examining the conduct underlying the conviction in question to
assess whether the defendant deserves an enhanced sentence, these
courts consider only the "statutory definition" of the offense.4 This
approach has resulted in the imposition of lengthy sentences for
recidivist offenders regardless of whether their criminal conduct
actually posed a serious threat to the well-being of others. This
result is especially troubling when escape offenses are at issue,
1. See Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable
Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1685 (1992).
2. See William W. Wilkins, Jr., The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Striking an
Appropriate Balance, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 571, 577-78 (1992).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 58 F.3d 1117, 1121 (6th Cir. 1995).
4. Id.
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for the vast majority of escapes are "walk-aways," which do not
inherently pose a serious risk of harm to others.'
In the recent decision of United States v. Thomas,' the D.C.
Circuit questioned the categorical method of analysis several other
circuit courts have employed when inquiring as to whether an
escape offense constitutes a crime of violence under the career
offender provision of the Guidelines.7 Specifically, the D.C. Circuit,
in declining to follow the approach adhered to by its fellow federal
appellate courts, suggested that the application of the categorical
method of analysis would result in incorrect outcomes.8 The set of
facts in the instant case, however, did not necessitate that the D.C.
Circuit propose an alternative method of analysis, as the court
asserted that the application of any approach in this instance would
have rendered the same result.9 Even so, the D.C. Circuit's hesi-
tance to follow the trend set by several other jurisdictions sets the
stage for the introduction of a different method of analysis when
considering crime of violence inquiries involving escape offenses.
This Note will assess the utility of the categorical approach, as
well as the similar intermediate approach, and draw comparisons
with a proposed fact-based approach in order to demonstrate that
the fact-based approach proves most effective when conducting
crime of violence inquiries involving escape offenses. Part I will
provide a brief overview of the career offender provision of the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. More specifically, it will examine the
meaning of the phrase "crime of violence" in the career offender
provision, as defined by the Guidelines, fleshed out by the commen-
tary to the Guidelines, and interpreted by the federal judiciary. Part
II will consider the elements of an escape offense and the current
treatment of escape offenses in crime of violence inquiries. A basic
understanding of an escape offense is essential to determine
whether courts need to alter the manner in which they carry out
these crime of violence analyses. Part III will argue for the rejection
of the categorical and intermediate approaches, and for adherence
5. See infra Part III.A and note 64 and accompanying text.
6. 333 F.3d 280 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
7. Id. at 282.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 282-83.
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to a fact-based analysis when assessing whether an escape offense
constitutes a crime of violence. This argument rests heavily on the
fact that, because not all escape offenses inherently pose a serious
risk of harm to others, the use of a fact-based approach renders the
most appropriate sentence determinations.
I. THE MEANING OF "CRIME OF VIOLENCE"
A. Overview of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
In response to ever-growing concern over the marked disparities
in criminal sentencing,' ° Congress passed legislation in 1984
that created the U.S. Sentencing Commission and supplied the
Commission with the power to formulate a uniform set of sentencing
guidelines that the federal court system would adopt.' The
byproduct of this legislation, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, took
effect on November 1, 1987.12
The centerpiece of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines is a sentenc-
ing grid that consists of forty-three offense levels situated on the
vertical axis and six criminal history categories located on the
horizontal axis.'" A sentence range appears at each point on the grid
where a particular offense level intersects with a particular criminal
history category.' 4 Absent "unusual circumstances," 15 the court must
sentence the defendant to a term that falls within this range. 6 In
10. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1942-46 (1988).
11. John Patrick Crossett, Comment, The United States Sentencing Commission and the
Problem of Non-Residential Burglary Under the Career Offender Provision of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 6 GEO. MASON L. REv. 675, 675-76 (1998); see Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559,
3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586 (2000), 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (2000)).
12. Ogletree, supra note 10, at 1950.
13. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (2003); Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R.
Kipp, An Examination of Emerging Departure Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 6 (1991).
14. Selya & Kipp, supra note 13, at 6.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000) (requiring the court to impose a sentence within the range
"unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind,
or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described").
16. Selya & Kipp, supra note 13, at 6.
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order to determine the relevant sentencing range in a particular
instance, a court must follow the Guidelines' application instruc-
tions-.7 These instructions first direct the court to determine the
base offense level applicable to the crime in question.'8 The court
then proceeds to adjust this offense level upward or downward
depending upon the existence or absence of a variety of factors,
including whether the defendant has a criminal history. 9
B. The Career Offender Provision
In accordance with congressional directive,20 the Guidelines
include a provision echoing the notion that particular repeat
criminal offenders should receive sentences that either meet or
approach the maximum penalty authorized under the relevant
statute.21 Specifically, the career offender provision applies to
recidivist offenders over eighteen years of age who both: (1)
currently face a conviction in federal court for a "crime of violence"
or "controlled substance offense;" and (2) previously received felony
convictions in either state or federal court for two or more crimes of
violence or controlled substance offenses.22
If the career offender provision applies in a particular case,
the sentencing court places the defendant in criminal history
category VI, the highest such category. 23 Next, the court determines
the offense level by looking to the defendant's "offense statutory
maximum."' The court then refers to the sentencing grid to
ascertain the applicable sentencing range.25
17. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (2000).
21. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1; Crossett, supra note 11, at 681.
22. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1.
23. Jeffrey H. Knox, Legislating Through the Use of Commentary: The Sentencing
Commission's Interpretation of § 994(h) of the Sentencing Reform Act, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 906, 910 (1998).
24. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELIE MANUAL § 4B1.1; Knox, supra note 23, at 910. It should
be noted that when the career offender provision is not invoked, the crime in question
determines the offense level. Id. at 910; see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1.
25. Knox, supra note 23, at 910.
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C. Textual Definition of "Crime of Violence"
According to the text of the Guidelines, the term "crime of
violence" refers to any offense under federal or state law carrying a
potential prison sentence of at least one year that either "has an
element ... of physical force" against another person or "is burglary
of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another."26
The commentary accompanying section 4B1.2 if the Guidelines
provides further insight into the meaning of a crime of violence.
First, the commentary enumerates ten offenses that categorically
constitute a crime of violence.21 Second, the commentary explains
that any offense not included in the aforementioned list is a crime
of violence if "that offense has as an element ... of physical force"
against another person or if "the conduct set forth (i.e., expressly
charged) in the count of which the defendant was convicted ... by its
nature, presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another."2' Although not part of the Guidelines themselves, this
commentary certainly carries significant weight, as the Supreme
Court held that commentary to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines that
interprets or explains a provision is "authoritative unless it violates
the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a
plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline."'
D. Courts' Interpretation of "Crime of Violence"
Despite the guidance seemingly provided by the Guidelines and
the accompanying application notes, courts have struggled in
applying the crime of violence standard to offenses not enumerated
in the Guidelines. As a result, several different approaches have
developed across jurisdictions. One method of analysis employed to
determine whether an offense constitutes a crime of violence is
26. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a).
27. These enumerated offenses are murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated
assault, forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit, and
burglary of a dwelling. Id. § 4B1.2, cmt. n.1.
28. Id.
29. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993).
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categorical. Under this approach, which stems from the Supreme
Court's ruling in Taylor v. United States," the court considers only
the statutory definition of the offense in question.31 For example,
upon examining the Tennessee statute concerning the offense of
assault with intent to commit sexual battery, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that, because the statute deals with circumstances that
may or may not pose a serious risk of harm, the court could not
categorically deem the instant offense a crime of violence.3"
When the statute in question does not clearly indicate that the
instant offense amounts to a crime of violence, a court may conduct
a more thorough inquiry.33 This alternative method of analysis,
sometimes referred to as the "intermediate" approach,"4 not only
examines the statutory elements, but also considers the information
laid out in the indictment 5 and, in some instances, other "easily
produced and evaluated court documents."3' This approach most
closely mirrors the commentary to the Guidelines, as the conduct
"expressly charged"37 seemingly refers to information presented in
the indictment.s
30. 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990) (holding that, when determining whether a prior conviction
constitutes a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act, the sentencing court
generally must adhere to a categorical approach that considers only the statutory definition
of the prior offense in question).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 58 F.3d 1117, 1124 (6th Cir. 1995).
32. Id.
33. See id; see also Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602 (noting that, in a small subset of cases, a
sentencing court may consider documents such as the indictment and jury instructions to
ascertain the precise offense with which the defendant was charged as well as what the jury
had to find in order to convict).
34. See Jennifer Riley, Note, Statutory Rape as a Crime of Violence for Purposes of
Sentence Enhancement Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines: Proposing a Limited
Fact-Based Analysis, 34 IND. L. REV. 1507, 1512 (2001); cf United States v. Sherbondy, 865
F.2d 996, 1008 n.16 (9th Cir. 1988): "We recognize that there may be an intermediate
approach ... in which a sentencing judge would neither limit his analysis to the category of
offense committed nor conduct a full hearing into the individual acts of the defendant, but
rather would look only to the court records of prior convictions."
35. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 180 F.3d 675, 676 (5th Cir. 1999).
36. See United States v. Spell, 44 F.3d 936, 939 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating that applicable
documents include "the judgment of conviction, charging papers, plea agreement, presentence
report adopted by the court, and the findings of a sentencing judge").
37. U.S. SENTENCING GuDELmmNs MANUAL § 4B1.2, cmt. n.1 (2003).
38. See United States v. Fitzhugh, 954 F.2d 253, 254 (5th Cir. 1992) (asserting that the
Guidelines' commentary limits the court in crime of violence inquiries, as it can look to only
conduct "set forth in the count of which the defendant was convicted").
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A final method of analysis is fact-based, in that the court takes
into account the underlying facts surrounding the conviction for the
offense in question.39 The 1991 amendments to the commentary to
section 4B1.2, however, added language implying that a court's use
of a fact-based analysis was improper.40 Specifically, the amend-
ments indicate that the conduct the court is to evaluate consists of
that which was "expressly charged."4 1 Moreover, the amendments
instruct that "the conduct of which the defendant was convicted is
the focus of inquiry."42
Due to these amendments, as well as the alleged "impracticability
and unfairness" of a factual inquiry into a defendant's prior
conviction,' courts have declined to adopt the fact-based approach."
Yet, some courts have followed the lead of scholars,' alluding to the
appropriateness of a fact-based approach in particular instances.'
II. ESCAPE OFFENSES AND THEIR TREATMENT IN CRIME OF
VIOLENCE INQUIRIES
A. The Elements of Escape
To determine whether a fact-based approach is the best method
of analysis for crime of violence inquiries involving escape offenses,
39. See, e.g., United States v. Chapple, 942 F.2d 439, 441-42 (7th Cir. 1991).
40. See Fitzhugh, 954 F.2d at 255.
41. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4BI.2, historical notes.
42. Id.
43. United States v. Arnold, 58 F.3d 1117, 1121 (6th Cir. 1995).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 310 F.3d 550, 554 (7th Cir. 2002); cf Taylor v.
United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600-02 (1990) (rejecting a fact-based analysis with regard to
inquiries as to whether an offense constitutes a "violent felony" under the Armed Career
Criminal Act).
45. Writings from the academic community have called for the utilization of a fact-based
approach when particular offenses are at issue. For instance, some individuals have argued
for the application of a fact-based analysis in cases involving statutory rape offenses. See
generally Lewis Bossing, Note, Now Sixteen Could Get You Life: Statutory Rape, Meaningful
Consent, and the Implications for Federal Sentence Enhancement, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1205
(1998); Susan Fleischmann, Comment, Toward a Fact-Based Analysis of Statutory Rape
Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 425; Riley, supra note
34.
46. See United States v. Harris, 165 F.3d 1062, 1068 (6th Cir. 1999) ("We presume,
moreover, that there might be cases in which some other type of limited factual inquiry would
be appropriate.").
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it is necessary to consider the elements of an escape offense. Under
federal law,47 an individual commits the crime of escape when he
escapes or attempts to escape from the custody of an institution that
has confined him by authorization of the Attorney General, where
such custody arose via any process set forth under the laws of the
United States." An individual need not have possessed the intent
to escape for a court to convict him of this offense.49 Rather, the
prosecution must merely demonstrate that the defendant knew that
his conduct would "result in his leaving physical confinement
without permission."5 ° In fact, even if the defendant was initially
forced to escape against his will, he still commits the crime of escape
if, upon his involuntary escape, he willingly elects to remain at
large.51
Although a consideration of the crime of escape may evoke the
image of an inmate attempting to break out of a maximum-security
prison, the escape offense actually encompasses a much wider scope
of conduct. The flexibility with which the courts have construed the
term "custody" exemplifies the breadth of this offense. 2 Along with
one's confinement in a federal prison,' courts have ruled that the
government's "custody" over an individual extends to instances in
which he leaves a prerelease facility without permission54 or fails to
report to the authorities upon the revocation of his probation.5
47. This Note looks to the elements of the federal escape offense simply for convenience.
The elements of an escape under state law generally resemble those outlined in the federal
statute, so the present analysis is relevant when considering both federal and state escape
offenses. The only significant difference for the purpose of this analysis is that, unlike the
federal law, many state codes divide escape into several degrees based on the severity of the
offense. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5121 (West 1983).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 751 (2000).
49. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 408 (1980).
50. Id.
51. United States v. Chapman, 455 F.2d 746, 749-50 (5th Cir. 1972).
52. See Grant H. Morris, Escaping the Asylum: When Freedom is a Crime, 40 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 481, 489 (2003).
53. See United States v. Camacho, 277 F. Supp. 814, 816 (D. Ariz. 1967).
54. See United States v. Taylor, 485 F.2d 1077, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
55. See United States v. Keller, 912 F.2d 1058, 1060 (9th Cir. 1990).
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B. Escape as a Crime of Violence
Upon inquiring whether an escape offense constitutes a crime of
violence, courts have considered the applicability of each of the
three methods of analysis discussed in Part I. Several jurisdictions
have elected to follow a categorical approach. For instance, in
United States v. Dickerson,' the Fourth Circuit examined the
escape offense in the abstract,57 inevitably concluding that an
escape, even one in which an individual stealthily fled from a
federal maximum-security prison, presented a "potential risk of
physical injury" that satisfied the career offender provision of the
Guidelines." The court reasoned that such a risk existed because
"the escapee, intent on his goal of escaping, faces the decision of
whether to dispel the interference or yield to it."59
Despite its adherence to a categorical approach, the Fourth
Circuit implied that the default method of analysis in making crime
of violence inquiries was the intermediate approach.' The court
justified its application of the categorical approach on the fact that
it could not assess the circumstances surrounding the instant escape
offense by examining the indictment, as this document contained
little informative content.61 This reasoning also prevailed in United
States v. Luster,62 as the Third Circuit maintained that, because the
instant charging document closely tracked the language of the
escape statute, the focus shifted to a consideration of whether
escape, by its nature, posed a "serious potential risk of physical
injury to another.' 3 Having determined its method of analysis, the
court held that a "walk-away" escape64 inherently presented the
aforementioned risk and, therefore, constituted a crime of violence.'
56. 77 F.3d 774 (4th Cir. 1996).
57. See id. at 777.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 776.
61. See id.
62. 305 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2002).
63. Id. at 202 (quoting Dickerson, 77 F.3d at 776).
64. This form of escape occurs when an individual removes himself from custody
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In United States v. Nation," the Eighth Circuit also seemingly
invoked a categorical analysis when it deemed escape a crime of
violence."7 Yet, the court appeared to base its conclusion, in part,
on a consideration of the expressly charged conduct." What the
court identified as a "categorical" approach, therefore, actually
more closely resembles an intermediate approach. This apparent
mislabeling of the approach adopted by the court is informative in
that it highlights the marked similarity between the categorical and
intermediate analyses. An assessment of the decision making of the
Tenth Circuit further supports this contention.
In United States v. Gosling,69 the Tenth Circuit "expressly
declined" to employ a categorical analysis7v Instead, the court
looked to the indictment, eventually concluding that the expressly
charged conduct "by its nature involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another."v" In support
of this assertion, however, the court explained that "every escape
scenario is a powder keg, which may or may not explode into
violence and result in physical injury to someone at any given time,
but which always has the serious potential to do so." 2 This reason-
ing suggests that all escape offenses constitute a crime of violence.
Although not adopting a categorical approach by name, 3 the Tenth
Circuit essentially employed a method of analysis categorical in the
results it produces.7 4
66. 243 F.3d 467 (8th Cir. 2001).
67. See id. at 472.
68. See id. (examining the particulars of the instant information).
69. 39 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 1994).
70. Id. at 1142 n.3.
71. Id. at 1142-43.
72. Id. at 1142.
73. Despite Gosling's explicit refusal to adopt a categorical approach, the Tenth Circuit,
in a subsequent decision, referred to the view of Gosling as "categorical." See United States
v. Mitchell, 113 F.3d 1528, 1533 (10th Cir. 1997).
74. The Fifth Circuit reached the same outcome in United States v. Ruiz, for despite
examining the instant indictment, the court ultimately invoked the "powder keg" reasoning
of Gosling. See 180 F.3d 675, 676-77 (5th Cir. 1999). The First, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits
have also reached categorical findings with regard to the issue of whether escape constitutes
a crime of violence under the career offender provision of the Guidelines. See United States
v. Winn, 364 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Bryant, 310 F.3d 550, 551 (7th Cir.
2002); United States v. Gay, 251 F.3d 950, 954-55 (11th Cir. 2001).
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Regardless of whether the aforementioned jurisdictions have
adhered to a categorical approach, these circuit courts have
uniformly discredited a fact-based method of analysis. For instance,
the Eighth Circuit has maintained that, because the Guidelines
instruct the sentencing court to look to the expressly charged
conduct when making a crime of violence determination, the court
cannot consider the underlying facts surrounding the conviction.7"
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has asserted that the commentary to
section 4B1.2 of the Guidelines makes "clear that only conduct 'set
forth in the count of which the defendant was convicted' may be
considered in determining whether [an] offense is a crime of
violence."76 As a result, the Fifth Circuit has stated that it cannot
examine the underlying facts of the defendant's conviction if those
facts are not contained in the indictment.7
Although most jurisdictions have rebuked the fact-based ap-
proach, a few courts have alluded to the possible utility of such an
approach. In United States v. Harris,7" the Sixth Circuit adopted
the reasoning of Gosling, ultimately holding that the instant
escape offense constituted a crime of violence.79 Yet, while the
court considered only the indictment relating to the conviction in
question, the court stated that "there might be cases in which some
other type of limited factual inquiry would be appropriate."'
In United States v. Thomas,s" the D.C. Circuit implied that a fact-
based approach might be appropriate by way of its criticism of the
categorical method adopted by the aforementioned circuit courts.
8 2
In the instant case, the court considered whether the defendant's
prior conviction for escaping from an officer constituted a crime of
violence under the career offender provision of the Guidelines.'
Considering that such an offense constituted a crime of violence
75. See United States v. Nation, 243 F.3d 467, 472 (8th Cir. 2001).
76. United States v. Fitzhugh, 954 F.2d 253, 254 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINEs MANUAL § 4B1.2, cmt. n.1) (2003).
77. See Ruiz, 180 F.3d at 676.
78. 165 F.3d 1062 (6th Cir. 1999).
79. Id. at 1068.
80. Id.
81. 333 F.3d 280 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
82. Id. at 282.
83. See id.
20041
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regardless of which approach the court employed,8" the D.C. Circuit
maintained that it did not have to embrace a particular method of
analysis.85 Yet, the court did not hesitate to put forth its thoughts
regarding the utility of the categorical approach.
Specifically, the court suggested that the categorical approach
was flawed, in that the reasoning underlying this method of
analysis "prove [d] too much."' Jurisdictions that employ a categori-
cal analysis have asserted that an escape offense inherently
"involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another." v Although the process of detaining an escapee
may inherently give rise to a potential risk of harm to others, the
D.C. Circuit explained that such a risk is present as to the capture
of anyone who breaks the law. 8 The conclusion that follows is that
"all crimes become crimes of violence."89 Due to the fact that the
reasoning for a categorical method of analysis as applied to the
offense of escape produces such an incongruous result, the D.C.
Circuit declined to adopt this approach.9
Even though the circumstances in the instant case did not compel
the D.C. Circuit to adopt a particular methodology, the court's view
of the categorical approach implies that there may be a place for a
fact-based analysis when escape offenses are at issue. In fact, had
the instant conviction been a conviction for "escape from an institu-
tion," the court suggested it might have had to decide which of the
two approaches to adopt.9 Given the court's uneasiness in embrac-
ing a categorical approach, it certainly seems possible that, if
forced to choose amongst the available methods of analysis, the
D.C. Circuit would have elected to follow a fact-based approach.
This statement is supported by the D.C. Circuit's assertion that "[a]
prisoner not returning to a halfway house or sneaking away from an
84. See id. at 283 (stating that a prisoner's escape from the custody of an officer inherently
creates a risk of harm to others).
85. Id. at 282.
86. Id.
87. United States v. Dickerson, 77 F.3d 774, 777 (4th Cir. 1996).
88. Thomas, 333 F.3d at 282.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 283.
356 [Vol. 46:345
ESCAPING A RIGID ANALYSIS
unguarded position in the night may not inherently create a risk of
harm to others."92
III. THE ARGUMENT FOR USE OF A FACT-BASED APPROACH WITH
REGARD TO CRIME OF VIOLENCE INQUIRIES INVOLVING ESCAPE
OFFENSES
A. All Escapes Do Not Inherently Pose a Risk of Harm
In holding that an escape offense categorically constitutes a crime
of violence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, several circuit
courts have likened an escape to a "powder keg."93 These jurisdic-
tions have contended that, although violence may not arise during
a particular escape, there always exists the potential for such
violence to arise. 9' The potential for violence to come about at any
time stems from the fact that an escapee "is likely to possess a
variety of supercharged emotions, and in evading those trying to
recapture him, may feel threatened by police officers, ordinary
citizens, or even fellow escapees."95 Even though this reasoning is
certainly plausible with regard to some escape offenses, it fails to
describe all escape offenses correctly.
In order to understand why an escape, in general, does not
inherently pose a risk of harm to others, the focus must first turn to
the purpose of an escape. All criminal acts ideally purport to achieve
some primary purpose. For instance, the primary purpose of robbing
an individual is, at least in the abstract, to obtain personal
property.9 The primary purpose of committing arson is to damage
or destroy a structure.97 Unless an individual fulfills the primary
purpose, he will not complete the crime.9"
The primary purpose of escaping from custody is significantly
different from the purpose of other crimes. Whereas a criminal who
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., United States v. Gosling, 39 F.3d 1140, 1142 (10th Cir. 1994).
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. See 18 U.S.C. § 2112 (2000).
97. See 18 U.S.C. § 81 (2000).
98. For instance, if an individual fails in his efforts to take another's personal property,
the former will have committed only attempted robbery. See 18 U.S.C. § 2112.
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commits a non-escape offense may hope to avoid detection by the
authorities, the primary purpose of escaping from custody is to
avoid such detection.99 In other words, the goal of the escape is to
circumvent confrontation. On the contrary, the fundamental goal
of a non-escape offense is not to evade confrontation but to fulfill a
purpose that relates to the substantive elements of the offense.
Given that the escapee, unlike other criminals, at least theoretically
places the most emphasis on eluding detection by the police, it
becomes difficult to conclude that the potential for serious harm
inherently exists during the commission of all escapes.
Of course, although escapees may ideally seek to escape by
stealthily avoiding detection by the authorities, there are instances
in which confrontations between the escapee and the authorities
arise. For instance, confrontation and subsequent violence may
develop when an individual imprisoned in a maximum-security
facility seeks to escape. In fact, for this individual to escape
successfully, he may need to resort to force to evade prison person-
nel trained to prevent such an escape, which may result in the
prison staff or other inmates suffering harm."°
On the contrary, there are escape scenarios in which the previ-
ously mentioned dangers are not typically present. One such
scenario involves the convicted individual who escapes from a
prerelease program. Prerelease programs typically take the form of
assignment to a halfway house, a community-based residential
facility designed for inmates whose sentences expire shortly after
entering the facility.'0 The purpose of transferring a convicted
individual from a prison to a halfway house is to allow him to obtain
the skills and opportunities that will enable him to reintegrate
himself into the community once he has served his sentence. 0 2 For
instance, under a work release program, residents of the community
99. See United States v. Jackson, 301 F.3d 59,63 (2d Cir. 2002) ("An inmate who escapes
by peacefully walking away from a work site will (if he can) be inconspicuous and discreet,
and will (if he can) avoid confrontation and force.").
100. For example, in trying to escape from a maximum-security prison in Florida, an
inmate fatally wounded a corrections officer by hitting the officer with a sledgehammer.
Michael A. Scarcella, Inmate Named in Killing of Officer, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Feb. 8,
2004, at B1, 2004 WL 58976827.
101. EDWARD J. LATESSA & HARRY E. ALLEN, CORRECTIONS IN THE COMMUNITY 345 (1997).
102. Id. at 350.
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facility are periodically released from physical supervision so that
they can undertake regular employment.'0 3 The overseers of the
halfway house may allow a resident to leave the premises for other
purposes, provided he remains within the surrounding area.10 ' The
resident generally must sign in and out when going to and from the
halfway house, and may leave the facility only during designated
hours. 5
Although the resident continues to remain "in custody" within the
meaning of federal law during this release period, the only
restraint burdening him is the restriction that he must return to the
facility at the culmination of the release period."° If a resident of
the halfway house does not return to the facility, he can be held to
have committed the crime of escape."° Even if the individual merely
fails to return before the expiration of his "curfew," the government
can bring forth an escape charge successfully."° Considering the
ease with which these walk-away escapes can be carried out, it is
not surprising that the vast majority of escapes are walk-aways.' °
Given that the only barrier preventing an individual from
escaping from a prerelease program is the rule that he cannot do
so," 0 it is difficult to conclude that this type of escape inherently
poses the potential for harm."' Yet, the Eighth Circuit has argued
that "[elven the most peaceful escape cannot eliminate the potential
for violent conflict when the authorities attempt to recapture the
103. See, e.g., United States v. Rudinsky, 439 F.2d 1074, 1075 (6th Cir. 1971) (explaining,
in brief terms, the nature of the defendant's release program).
104. See id. (noting that the halfway house's rules restricted the defendant by requiring
him to remain within the county limits).
105. See McCullough v. United States, 369 F.2d 548,549 (8th Cir. 1966).
106. See Rudinsky, 439 F.2d at 1076-77.
107. See, e.g., Rindgo v. United States, 411 A.2d 373,378 (D.C. 1980).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 569 F.2d 499, 501 (9th Cir. 1978).
109. Riots, Disturbances, Violence, Assaults, and Escapes, 27 CORREC1IONS COMPENDIUM
6 (2002) (noting the results of a survey of forty United States and three Canadian correctional
systems, which indicated that of the 5629 reported successful or unsuccessful escape attempts
in 2001, eighty-nine percent constituted walk-away escapes).
110. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 17, United States v. Ruiz, 180 F.3d 675 (5th Cir.
1999) (No. 98-41073).
111. See Brief of Appellant Gay at 17, United States v. Gay, 251 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 2001)
(No. 00-14729-DD) ("An escapee from a community based corrections facility must not be
considered violent or he could not be there .... ').
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escapee. " "2 The Eighth Circuit, however, did not support this
assertion with empirical research indicating that individuals other
than the escapee frequently suffer injuries when the escapee
commits a walk-away escape."' Nor did the court reconcile its
conclusion with the fact that community-based facilities predomi-
nately house non-violent offenders.'" The court also failed to
account for the fact that many walk-away escapes merely involve a
resident's tardy return to the halfway house." 5 Given that walk-
away offenses appear to lack the inherent dangers that exist with
regard to an escape from a maximum-security penitentiary," 6 the
Eighth Circuit's failure to put forth empirical evidence challenging
this presumption renders the court's argument unpersuasive.1
7
112. United States v. Nation, 243 F.3d 467, 472 (8th Cir. 2001); see also United States v.
Bryant, 310 F.3d 550, 554 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that all escape offenses, including an
escape stemming from one's "failure to report back to a halfway house," are crimes of
violence).
113. See THOMAS W. HUTCHISON ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE 1285
(2003).
114. In 1998, only twelve percent ofoffenders held in halfway facilities in Washington, D.C.
were awaiting trial for violent felonies (as defined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Index) or convicted of violent felonies. Ctr. on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, Half Truths: The
Complicated Story of D.C.'s Halfway House "Escapees" (1999), available at http'l/www.cjcj.org/
pubs/halftruth/halftruth.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2004). Considering that the vast majority
of halfway house residents committed non-violent offenses, it is not surprising that rewards
offered for information that leads to the capture of these individuals pale in comparison to
rewards offered for inmates who escape from secure prison facilities. Compare U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Task Force Announces Rewards for Information on 50 Most Wanted Halfway House
Escapees (Apr. 1, 1999), available at http'J/www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1999/April/115ag.htm (last
visited Apr. 10, 2004) (announcing that the Justice Department is offering $200 rewards for
"information leading to the arrest of each of the 50 most wanted District of Columbia halfway
house escapees"), with Anti-Abortion Escapee Added to FBI Top 10 List, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22,
2001,2001 WL 2519965 (noting that the FBI is offering $50,000 for information that leads to
the arrest of an escaped prison inmate who previously had threatened to kill abortion
providers).
115. See Ctr. on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, supra note 114 (stating that escapes from
Washington, D.C. halfway houses often consisted of trivial tardiness).
116. See United States v. Hillstrom, 988 F.2d 448, 453 (3d Cir. 1993) ("The non-violent
walk-away ... does not present the potential dangers found in 'going over the wall.'" (quoting
Paul D. Borman, Chief Federal Defender for the Eastern District of Michigan)).
117. Cf William R. Maynard, Judge-Made Sentence Enhancements: A Question of Fact, of
Law, or of the Constitution?, 25 CHAMPION 14, 16 (2001) (maintaining that, in categorically
ruling that escape is a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act, the court in
United States v. Moudy, 132 F.3d 618 (10th Cir. 1998), "relied on certain inherent qualities
the court (not jurors or Congress) attributed to escape"). Although the Eighth Circuit's
unsubstantiated holding is troubling enough, it is even more disconcerting that some courts
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The Eighth Circuit's argument becomes even less persuasive
when one considers how state legislatures treat escape offenses.
Several states' criminal codes divide escape into degrees, each of
which is dependent upon the existence or lack of particular
factors.11 One such factor is whether the defendant escaped from a
correctional facility or from a less secure form of custody." 9 Because
these statutes require courts to consider the type of escape when
grading the offense, they suggest that some escapes are inherently
less dangerous than other escapes. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
themselves echo this sentiment, albeit outside the context of the
career offender provision. According to the Guidelines, an individual
convicted of escape may receive a downward departure in his
sentence under certain circumstances. ' 0 Specifically, if the individ-
ual escapes "from the non-secure custody of a community corrections
center, community treatment center, 'halfway house,' or similar
facility," he may receive a downward departure in his sentence. 121
Again, this language implies that individuals who escape from less
secure facilities should be punished less severely than those who
escape from more heavily secured facilities. Both state criminal
codes and the Guidelines themselves take into account the varying
severity of escape offenses. It seems contradictory, therefore, to
treat all escape offenses alike under the career offender provision by
holding that every offense poses a serious potential risk of harm to
others.
have simply regurgitated the language of other jurisdictions. For instance, in United States
v. Ruiz, the Fifth Circuit based its holding on the fact that the court found "persuasive the
reasoning of our Tenth Circuit colleagues," as well as the fact that the Fourth and Sixth
Circuits had put forth similar rulings. 180 F.3d 675, 676-77 (5th Cir. 1999).
118. 4 WHARTON'S CRMINAL LAw § 644 (Charles E. Torcia ed., 15th ed. 1996).
119. Id.; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-10-31, 32, 33 (1975).
120. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Pl.1(b) (2003).
121. Id. § 2P1.1(bX3). This reduction would not apply, however, if the individual, "while
away from the facility, committed any federal, state, or local offense punishable by a term of
imprisonment of one year or more." Id.
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B: Categorical and Intermediate Approaches Produce Improper
Outcomes
Were one to champion the argument that all escapes do not
inherently present a threat of serious harm, it would be impossible
to simultaneously support the use of a categorical approach in the
context of crime of violence inquiries involving escape offenses. For
if one were to begin with the premise that all escape offenses are not
inherently dangerous, it would be illogical to employ a method of
analysis that would lead to the conclusion that all escape offenses
are inherently dangerous. Of course, those who favor use of the
categorical approach view all escape offenses as posing a serious
risk of harm. 22 Yet, the reasoning underlying this contention
renders the use of the categorical method of analysis inappropriate
with respect to escape offenses.
As discussed in Part II, courts' application of the categorical
analysis to escape offenses results in questionable outcomes. These
jurisdictions begin with the premise that the recapturing of an
escapee always has the potential to give rise to a violent encounter
between the escapee and the authorities.'23 Espousal of this premise
leads these courts to hold that an escape offense is categorically a
crime of violence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.'24 Although
the inferential path connecting the premise with the conclusion
appears sound, a problem arises when one considers that a court
could conceivably trace this path with regard to any crime.2 5 In
other words, because violence could erupt when the authorities
attempt to detain any person at large, it follows that all offenses are
crimes of violence. 26
This incongruous result clearly suggests the inappropriateness of
the categorical analysis, at least when the reasoning is limited to
that which has been presented by the courts. More importantly,
however, it suggests that there must exist more than the possibility
of conflict upon the criminal's detainment for the underlying offense
122. See, e.g., United States v. Dickerson, 77 F.3d 774, 777 (4th Cir. 1996).
123. See United States v. Thomas, 333 F.3d 280, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
124. See, e.g., Dickerson, 77 F.3d at 777.
125. See Thomas, 333 F.3d at 282.
126. See id.
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to constitute a crime of violence. For instance, with regard to the
crime of non-residential burglary, there is arguably the additional
risk that a private citizen could "happen upon the crime."'27 As a
result, therefore, some courts have deemed this offense a crime of
violence. 2 '
One could contend that a similar risk exists with regard to every
escape offense, for a private citizen could interfere, intentionally or
unintentionally, with the escapee's flight from the authorities.' 29
Upon further consideration of this potential risk, however, it
becomes evident that such harm could occur in only select circum-
stances. It is certainly foreseeable that a penitentiary escapee,
donned in a prison uniform and closely pursued by prison authori-
ties, could face an altercation with private citizens during the course
of his escape. As it is obvious to the common observer that the
escapee in this instance is, in fact, an escapee, it is plausible that
citizens would take affirmative steps to aid in the apprehension of
the escapee. 3 ° If this aid involves attempts to detain the escapee
directly, there is little question that violence could result.
Consider, however, a situation in which a convicted individual
escapes from a prerelease program. Instead of returning to the
residential facility, were the plain-clothed escapee simply to travel
to an inappropriate destination (e.g., outside the county limits), it
seems unlikely that a violent confrontation would necessarily result
between the escapee and private citizens.' 3 ' Aside from scenarios in
which the media heavily documents the escapee's flight,132 there
127. United States v. Jackson, 22 F.3d 583, 584 (5th Cir. 1994).
128. See Crossett, supra note 11, at 684.
129. Dickerson, 77 F.3d at 777.
130. See Keren Holland, Police - Prison Escapee May Be Trying to Steal Vehicle,
KALGOORLIE MINER, Dec. 17, 2003, 2003 WL 60716346 (detailing that a citizen in Australia
notified police after the individual thwarted a burglary attempt by a prison escapee).
131. See Janell Cole, Inmate Fleeing, Not Dangerous, BISMARCK TRIB., July 1, 1995, at 6A
(noting that local authorities in North Dakota stated that an inmate who escaped by leaving
his prerelease program was not considered dangerous).
132. One would suspect that the escape of an inmate from a maximum-security
penitentiary would receive far greater media exposure than the failure of a resident to return
to a community-based facility, especially given that the latter individual would likely have
been released from the facility in short order anyway. Compare Ray Gibson & Jerry Shnay,
Security Hit in Breakout from Joliet, CHI. TREB., Feb. 13, 1990, at C1, 1990 WVL 2929988
(detailing that over one hundred correctional officers and police conducted a "statewide
manhunt" for five inmates who escaped from a maximum-security prison), with 10-Year
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would be no reason for the average citizen to suspect that the
plain-clothed escapee is, in fact, an escapee." Given that private
citizens are not likely to "happen upon" an escapee in every
particular instance, the argument used to support a finding that
non-residential burglary categorically constitutes a crime of
violence cannot be utilized with regard to escape. The inability to
invoke this argument means that the generic risk of detaining a
criminal remains the only potential justification for categorically
deeming escape a crime of violence. Due to the aforementioned
problem tied to this argument, there seems to be no contention that
both correctly points to a potential risk of harm to others and leads
to intelligible outcomes.
The foregoing analysis in this section demonstrates the flawed
nature of the categorical approach when applied to crime of violence
inquiries involving escape offenses. One can apply this same
analysis when examining the utility of the intermediate approach.
As stated previously, the intermediate approach, at least in the
context of escape, is essentially equivalent to the categorical method
of analysis." The indictment for an escape charge may provide
little information beyond the statutory provision a court considers
under the categorical approach.13 For instance, in United States
v. Ruiz, the indictment charged that the defendant "knowingly
escape [d] from custody of [a federal prison camp] ... in which he was
lawfully confined."1" Likely because the indictment adds little to the
inquiry, courts that invoke the intermediate analysis ultimately
have reached a categorical -holding.3 v As a result, the aforemen-
Fugitive Caught in N.Y Subway, CHI. TRPB., Apr. 28, 1992, at C14, 1992 WL 4476992 (noting
in very brief terms that an individual who escaped from a halfway house more than ten years
earlier was apprehended when he attempted to ride the subway without placing a token in
the turnstile).
133. Cf United States v. Jackson, 22 F.3d 583, 585 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that the
defendant's attempt to take parts from an air conditioning unit in the backyard of a house
that had been vacant for seven years did not pose a serious risk of injury to others).
134. See supra Part II.B.
135. See supra Part II.B.
136. 180 F.3d 675, 676 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting instant indictment); cf 18 U.S.C. § 751(a)
(2000) (stating that one commits the offense of escape when he "escapes or attempts to escape
from the custody of the Attorney General ... or from any institution or facility in which he is
confined by direction of the Attorney General").
137. See, e.g., United States v. Gosling, 39 F.3d 1140, 1142 (10th Cir. 1994).
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tioned defect of the categorical approach also exists with regard to
the intermediate approach.
C. The Fact-Based Approach and Its Reply to the Critics
This Part has explained that not all escape offenses pose a serious
risk of harm. Furthermore, this Part has highlighted the flaws in
the rationale used to support the invocation of the categorical and
intermediate approaches in the context of crime of violence inquiries
involving an escape offense. Given this analysis, it becomes evident
that the use of a fact-based approach most effectively results in
proper outcomes when conducting crime of violence inquiries
involving an escape offense. Under the proposed fact-based ap-
proach, a court would examine the underlying record in order to
determine whether the instant escape constituted a crime of
violence. 3 ' If the record failed to provide sufficient insight, the court
would hold an evidentiary hearing. 139 By inevitably bringing to light
the circumstances underlying escape convictions, the court could
effectively distinguish escapes that pose a risk of harm from those
that do not pose such a risk."
Despite the utility of the fact-based approach, several criticisms
have been directed at this method of analysis. One criticism
concerns the unfairness that could result when examining the trial
record. Specifically, because some facts in the record might have
only been alleged or not subject to a judicial fact-finding process, the
crime of violence determination may be inaccurate."'
Although some facts included in the record might not have been
proven conclusively, this does not necessarily mean that the crime
of violence determination will be inaccurate. When assessing
whether a particular escape poses a substantial risk of harm, the
key facts a court must consider are the type of custody from which
the defendant escaped and the means by which he escaped. Given
that it seems rather unlikely that the parties would sharply
138. See United States v. Goodman, 914 F.2d 696, 699 (5th Cir. 1990).
139. See Riley, supra note 34, at 1512.
140. See Fleischmann, supra note 45, at 432 (maintaining that the fact-based approach
"allows the sentencing judge to more accurately determine whether a particular defendant
truly poses a danger to society.").
141. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601 (1990); Riley, supra note 34, at 1516.
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disagree as to the nature of these particulars at trial," a court
would have access to reasonably accurate information when making
its ruling on the crime of violence issue. If the sentencing court did
in fact face a clouded evidentiary picture, because either the
defendant pleaded guilty to the escape offense 3 or the parties
vehemently disagreed on the material issues in the underlying trial,
the sentencing court would be empowered to conduct an evidentiary
hearing to better assess the matter at hand.
A second criticism involves flaws of the evidentiary hearing that
a court may hold to assist in its crime of violence inquiry. Because
this hearing might take place long after the crime has occurred or
might fail to include all the witnesses who originally testified, it is
possible that the hearing would not accurately reflect how the crime
actually transpired.144 Moreover, this long lapse between the
commission of the crime and the hearing would burden the defen-
dant, in that it would require him to rebut old charges.1"
The fear that stale or absent evidence might compromise the
accuracy of the hearing is less weighty when dealing with an escape
offense than with other crimes. Given that an escape offense is a
victimless crime," the concern that the victim would be unable to
testify at the hearing, due to his absence or loss of memory, is
142. See United States v. Gay, 251 F.3d 950, 953 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting 'both parties
agreed that the underlying facts involved a situation where [the defendant] walked away from
a diversion facility in a non-violent manner"). Intuitively, it seems that the more hotly
debated issues would consist of the following: (1) whether the defendant's conduct actually
constituted an escape (e.g., whether the defendant possessed the requisite intent); and (2)
whether the defendant had a legitimate basis for escaping from custody, such that he should
not be held criminally liable. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
143. The Court in Taylor also raised concern over instances in which the defendant pleaded
guilty to a lesser included offense that substantively differed from the charged offense. See
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601-02. The Court asserted that "it would seem unfair to impose a
sentence enhancement as if the defendant had pleaded guilty" to the charged offense. Id. at
602. Unlike the crime of burglary, however, which was at issue in Taylor, an escape offense
is not readily accompanied by a substantively different lesser included offense. See, e.g.,
Williams v. State, 591 So.2d 582, 583 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (holding that resisting arrest is
not a lesser included offense of escape). The Court's concern, therefore, seems inapplicable in
this context.
144. United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 1008 (9th Cir. 1988); Riley, supra note 34,
at 1517.
145. Riley, supra note 34, at 1517.
146. Although an escapee, in the course of his escape, might inflict an injury upon another,
this injury is distinct from the elements of the escape itself. See 18 U.S.C. § 751 (2000).
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inapplicable in this context. Furthermore, because many escapees,
particularly those who walk away from a prerelease facility, do not
facilitate their escape by using a tangible object,14 7 there is not much
need to worry that important physical evidence would have been
lost or destroyed prior to the hearing.
Although these mitigating factors do not address the memory loss
of the defendant or the absence or imperfect recall of other wit-
nesses, it is difficult to conclude that these concerns will be so
pervasive that they will taint all evidentiary hearings, for not all
hearings will assess ancient convictions or suffer from the absence
of key witnesses. Granted, in some cases, stale evidence may
prevent the sentencing court from gaining sufficient insight into the
conviction in question. Under these circumstances, however, the
sentencing court would simply maintain the status quo by not
invoking the career offender provision, for acting otherwise in the
face of ambiguity would unfairly burden the defendant.'14
As for the alleged burden placed on the defendant because of the
potential long lapse between the crime and the hearing, this concern
is unconvincing when an escape offense is at issue. Given that
courts' application of the categorical approach has deemed all
escapes crimes of violence, 49 it is difficult to see why holding a
hearing would prove detrimental to the defendant. Rather, the
hearing would provide the defendant with the only opportunity to
prevent the court from invoking the career offender provision
against him. Moreover, as stated previously, if the lapse between
the conviction and the hearing prevented the defendant from
putting forth enough evidence to provide the sentencing court with
an accurate portrayal of the escape conviction, the court could err on
the side of leniency and refuse to invoke the career offender
provision upon sentencing the defendant.
There is also the argument that a fact-based approach would
place a heavy burden on the courts and waste finite judicial
147. See, e.g., Brief for the United States at 3, United States v. Cuna, 2003 WL 22416326
(5th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-11152) (detailing that the government charged the defendant for
escape when she failed to report to the halfway house in a timely fashion).
148. Cf United States v. Lazo-Ortiz, 136 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating that the
rule of lenity requires a court to construe ambiguous sentencing provisions in favor of the
defendant).
149. See supra Part II.B.
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resources. 50 Obviously, the fact-based method of analysis would
prove more time-consuming than the categorical approach. Yet,
given that escape offenses, when compared to other felonies, are
rare,151 any additional strain on judicial efficiency would be
minimal. Moreover, because adherence to the fact-based approach
would render the most appropriate and just sentences, the judicial
resources employed to accomplish these results are not wasted but
instead put to good use.
Finally, there is the argument that, because the fact-based
approach runs counter to the language of the Guidelines' application
notes, courts are prohibited from utilizing this method of analysis. 152
The application notes state that courts should rely on "the conduct
set forth (i.e., expressly charged)" when determining whether the
conviction in question constitutes a crime of violence. 153 This
language, coupled with the Supreme Court's ruling that the
commentary to the Guidelines is presumptively authoritative, 54
seems to suggest that courts cannot consider the facts underlying a
conviction when making a crime of violence inquiry. The commen-
tary to the Guidelines is not authoritative, however, when it is
inconsistent with the corresponding Guideline provision." A
showing that the commentary to the Guidelines' definition of a
crime of violence is inconsistent with that definition, therefore,
would provide courts with the freedom to adopt a fact-based
approach.
According to the Guidelines, an escape can constitute a crime of
violence only if the offense "involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another."5 6 Yet, in invoking the
commentary, which implies that a fact-based approach is inappro-
priate, courts have deemed inherently non-violent escape offenses
as crimes of violence. Due to the courts' adherence to the commen-
150. See Riley, supra note 34, at 1517.
151. In cases terminated in U.S. district courts during 2000, escape convictions constituted
less than one percent of all felony convictions. See U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 414 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire eds., 2001).
152. See United States v. Nation, 243 F.3d 467, 472 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Fitzhugh, 954 F.2d 253, 255 (5th Cir. 1992).
153. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2, cint. n.1 (2003).
154. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993).
155. See id.
156. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a).
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tary, therefore, a marked disparity exists between the courts'
rulings and the results that the Guidelines' definition of a crime of
violence intends to produce.
More generally, there is also a significant inconsistency between
the commentary in question and the mission of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines as a whole. Although the Guidelines were created
primarily to remedy marked disparity in sentencing, 57 the U.S.
Sentencing Commission stressed that "[tihe increase in uniformity
was not ... to be achieved through sacrificing proportionality."15 By
construing the commentary to the Guidelines' definition of a crime
of violence as binding on courts, however, these efforts to maintain
proportionality are thwarted. Despite the fact that some escape
offenses pose much less of a risk of harm than other escape offenses,
adhering to the commentary results in treating all of these crimes
equally when conducting a crime of violence inquiry. As a result, an
individual who committed an escape that lacked the requisite risk
of harm bears the burden of serving a sentence that is dispropor-
tionate to the degree of his culpability.159 This reality is especially
troublesome when one considers that, because the vast majority of
escapes constitute mere walk-aways,16 courts that adhere to the
Guidelines' commentary will hand down disproportionate sentences
in a great number of cases.
Given that the invocation of the commentary produces outcomes
that conflict with the crime of violence provision of the Guidelines,
as well as the purpose of the Guidelines as a whole, courts should
not view the commentary as authoritative with regard to crime of
violence determinations involving escape offenses. Instead, courts
should circumvent the commentary and utilize the fact-based
approach, thereby ensuring that the Guidelines' goal of maintaining
proportionality is met.
157. See Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 883-84 (1990).
158. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 13 (1987).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Gay, 251 F.3d 950, 951 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that the
probation department urged that the defendant be deemed a career offender with an elevated
offense level of 32, instead of the base offense level of 18).
160. See supra note 109.
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CONCLUSION
When one considers the problematic disparities in criminal
sentencing that existed prior to the adoption of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines in 1987,161 one cannot doubt the importance of maintain-
ing a degree of uniformity in sentencing. The federal judiciary's
repeated application of a categorical analysis to crime of violence
inquiries involving escape offenses has certainly furthered this
goal.'62 By alluding to the categorical approach's deficiencies and
refusing to adhere to this approach," however, the D.C. Circuit
fueled the debate as to whether this method of analysis was truly
the most appropriate approach when dealing with crime of violence
inquiries involving escape offenses. After comparing the various
methods of analysis, it becomes clear that use of the fact-based
approach is best when escape offenses are at issue.
Given that a large subset of escapes, particularly walk-away
escapes from a halfway house or similar facility, lack the inherent
dangers and risk to others that may accompany an escape from a
maximum-security penitentiary,"6 categorically deeming all escape
offenses as crimes of violence under the career offender provision
produces unsound results. These outcomes become even more
inappropriate when one considers that, outside the context of the
career offender provision, the Guidelines themselves recognize that
escapes differ in their level of culpability."6 As escape offenses
encompass conduct with varying degrees of culpability, a categorical
analysis, or an intermediate approach that resembles a categorical
approach, is not properly tailored to undertake crime of violence
inquiries involving escape offenses." A fact-based approach,
however, in which the sentencing court accesses the underlying
161. Former United States District Judge Marvin E. Frankel criticized the manner in
which federal courts determined sentences prior to the implementation of the Guidelines:
"[We] must not choose any longer to tolerate a regime of unreasoned, unconsidered caprice for
exercising the most awful power of organized society, the power to take liberty and ... life by
process of what purports to be law." Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN.
L. REv. 1, 2 (1972).
162. See supra Part II.B.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 81-90.
164. See supra Part III.A.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 120-2 1.
166. See supra Part III.B.
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record and may conduct an evidentiary hearing, possesses the
flexibility to assess whether a particular escape offense truly
constitutes a crime of violence. Although the tools with which the
court implements this approach may at times be imperfect, these
limitations are less glaring than would be the case if other offenses
were at issue.'67 Even in those instances in which deficiencies in the
record or hearing prevent the court from determining the nature of
the crime in question, the sentencing court is not handcuffed, for it
can deal with this ambiguity by properly maintaining the status quo
through its refusal to invoke the career offender provision."6
The Guidelines' application notes, which reject the fact-based
analysis, might appear to bar the use of this approach.169 One
reaches a different conclusion, however, when considering the fact
that, when dealing with crime of violence determinations pertaining
to escape offenses, only by employing the fact-based approach are
the Guidelines' goals met. That is, by assessing each escape offense
in order to determine which crimes indeed call for an elevated
punishment, the fact-based analysis accurately labels inherently
non-violent escapes as such, and it effectively balances the desire for
uniformity with that of proportionality.170
When confronting the question of whether escape offenses should
be deemed crimes of violence under the career offender provision of
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, the broad range of conduct that
escape offenses may involve necessitates a flexible approach. As
such, it is essential that the federal judiciary discard the categorical
analysis and adopt the fact-based approach. Only then can it pursue
a degree of uniformity in sentencing without fear that meeting
this goal will come at the expense of offenders receiving excessive
sentences.
Timothy W. Castor
167. See supra Part III.C.
168. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 152-54.
170. See supra Part III.C.
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